Developments in Syria could complicate Iran-Turkey relations, especially given that Tehran believes Ankara’s policies on Syria pose a threat to Iranian interests. Turkish policymakers are likely to be concerned about Iranian intervention in Syria that could affect the country’s fragile transition in ways that harm Turkey’s interests.
By Giorgio CAFIERO
Turkey and Iran’s complex relationship can best be described as a “cooperative rivalry.” The two countries maintain significant trade ties and their interests overlap on several issues, from opposing Israel’s war in Gaza and bombing of Syria to supporting Qatar during the 2017-2021 blockade. Turkey has also played a key role in helping Iran cushion the impact of Western sanctions. But with Ankara and Tehran aspiring to play increasingly influential roles in the Middle East, they have also at times seen high levels of competition and tension in bilateral affairs.
Following the fall of the Iranian-allied Syrian regime late last year and its replacement in Damascus by a Turkish-oriented political order, Syria’s fluid dynamics have, at least for now, shifted the balance of power in the Levant in Ankara’s favor, while weakening Tehran’s influence.
Developments in Syria could complicate Iran-Turkey relations, especially given that Tehran believes that Ankara’s policies on Syria pose a threat to Iranian interests. Turkish policymakers are likely to be concerned about Iranian intervention in Syria that could affect the country’s fragile transition in a way that would harm Turkey’s interests. However, Turkey and Iran can manage and share their tensions over Syria in a way that prevents direct hostilities between them. Moreover, if Turkey’s and Israel’s tensions over Syria continue to be fraught, there may also be reason to expect some degree of Iran-Turkey alignment in Syria.
IRAN’S LOSS AND TURKEY’S VICTORY
With Turkey emerging as a “big winner” in Syria after the fall of Bashar al-Assad, Iranian policymakers are nervous about some of the broader implications for Tehran’s strategic interests. With the rise of a Sunni Islamist government in Damascus—one that sees Iranian-backed non-state actors as a serious Regional threat and vows to stop the flow of Iranian weapons through Syria—Tehran has concerns about the future of Hezbollah, a group that has long played a critical role in the Iranian-led Axis of Resistance. With Assad out of the picture (after Iran invested tens of billions of dollars to prop up his regime) and a Turkish-oriented administration in charge in Damascus, Iran has suffered a humiliating defeat in Syria.
Iranian state-run media often portray Turkey as working with the United States and Israel to overthrow Assad, as part of a grander conspiracy aimed at strengthening the West and Israel while weakening Iran.
Since Assad fell late last year, a number of Iranian voices have criticized Turkey for its role in facilitating Azerbaijani oil exports to Israel amid the war in Gaza – arguing that Ankara bears some responsibility for Palestinian suffering. The Syrian tilt in Turkey’s favor comes after Ankara gained influence in the South Caucasus with the 2020 Karabakh war, a conflict that underscored the strength of the Azerbaijan-Turkey alliance while fueling major geopolitical and security concerns for Tehran. Turkey is determined to help the Islamist rebels-turned-rulers in Damascus cement their control over all of Syria.
Ankara sees the potential for a strong unitary state in Syria with a pro-Turkish government in power that is aligned with Turkey’s long-term interests. Turkey fears possible Iranian support for the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK)-linked People’s Protection Units (YPG) – the armed group in Syria that Ankara is most concerned about from a security perspective. Turkish policymakers are also monitoring the situation in Latakia, Tartus and other parts of western Syria, where, in the event of further fragmentation of the country, an Alawite-led separatist state backed by Iran could form, cutting off the new government in Damascus from most of the country’s Mediterranean coast.
PRECEDENT OF TENSION MANAGEMENT
As much as Turkey has gained influence in Syria at the expense of Iran and Russia, Ankara recognizes that Tehran has cards to play in post-Assad Syria, which could challenge Turkey and weaken Syria’s new government amid the war-torn country’s fragile transition. Within this context, Turkey and Iran are likely keen to prevent their Syria-related tensions from fueling hostilities in bilateral relations – they may even seek ways to advance shared interests through cooperation.
There is precedent for this. For example, in 2017, Turkey, Iran, and Russia met in Kazakhstan for the Astana Process (a forum on peace in Syria). Of course, the new reality in Syria is different from the situation in the country in 2017. But the Astana Process highlighted how Ankara and Tehran, despite their conflicting interests in the Syrian crisis, can come together as two Regional heavyweights and engage in dialogue oriented towards resolving the conflict. Although the Astana Process failed to resolve the civil war, the format, to be honest, led to a reduction in violence in Syria.
POTENTIAL FOR EXPANSION
Israel’s foreign policy vis-à-vis post-Assad Syria could play a role in aligning Turkey’s and Iran’s interests. At this stage, it is unclear whether the anti-Israel rhetoric of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan will translate into concrete action or how such action will play out. However, Turkey and Syria’s new government are exploring a defense pact that could include Turkish air bases in central Syria. This could fuel tensions between Turkey and Israel, which could play out in a variety of ways. Even if a Turkish-Israeli military confrontation on Syrian soil seems unlikely at this point, intensifying friction between these two US allies would probably serve Iran’s interests.
Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Sa’ar recently accused Ankara of facilitating Iranian money flows to Lebanon’s Hezbollah. If true, this would mean that Turkey is helping Iran maintain influence in the eastern Mediterranean.
The United States has also sanctioned Turkey-based Mira Ihracat Ithalat Petrol and its chief executive for “providing critical financial support” to a financial network that runs between Iran and Hezbollah. Some experts have noted that, since the fall of Assad, Iran may turn to Turkish airspace in seeking alternative routes for weapons to fly to Hezbollah. However, it is unclear whether Ankara would ever agree to play this role for Iran and Hezbollah. Looking ahead, the fragile transition in Syria is set to strengthen Ankara’s Regional influence in ways that complicate Turkey’s sensitive relationship with Iran. While the Trump administration would certainly like to see Turkish influence in Syria serve as a bulwark against Iran, it is unlikely that Ankara will approach the Islamic Republic in a way that is fully consistent with any U.S.-led “maximum pressure 2.0” agenda.
With determined actions in preventing hostilities with Iran, policymakers in Ankara are likely to preserve the new balance of power in Syria, while also maintaining a fruitful dialogue with Iran and taking into account Iranian security concerns on issues related to Syria.
(Giorgio Cafiero is the chief executive of Gulf State Analytics, a Washington, D.C.-based geopolitical consultancy, and a professor at Georgetown University)
