How would an opposition government behave towards the association, northern sovereignty, “no man’s land” and the demands that Grenell might bring from Belgrade?
By Andi BUSHATI
Although power is not a fruit to be enjoyed intellectually, it would be extremely interesting to see an experiment where the current Prime Minister of Kosovo decides to no longer lead the government. As long as his party did not reach the claimed ceiling of 500 thousand votes and could not win the necessary majority of seats in parliament on its own, it would be a daunting challenge to understand what would happen if – contrary to what he said at Sunday’s post-electoral rally – Albin Kurti were to abandon any attempt at a post-electoral coalition and move into opposition.
The new government would be created by a diverse union, which in these four years had only one thing in common: hostility to the point of hatred towards a single opponent. The refrain of their existence became the fight against a fool, who, for his disproportionate ego, was isolating Kosovo, separating it from its strategic allies, leaving it without the existential support of the West. From this perspective, Kurti was accused of the EU’s economic sanctions, of the harsh statements of the American embassy, of the pampering that the West was giving to the good student Vučić and of the cooling of relations with the Tirana government.
So, in the eyes of the opposition, he became the devil who was destroying the future of Kosovo. If he were to step down now, those who sounded the trumpets of this danger would have the opportunity to “fix” everything, so it would be very curious to try a different alternative…
Would they say yes, to please the international community, to holding elections and referendums in Serbia within the territory of Kosovo? Would they agree, on the condition of lifting sanctions, to establish an association that would seek the Bosnianization of the state? Would they allow, in exchange for the decoration of the “obedient student”, to leave the four municipalities of the North empty if the Serbian List continued to boycott the elections? Would they withdraw the nine police stations from the North, restore the dinar, parallel structures and bring back criminal organizations such as the “Civil Protection” and the “Northern Brigade”? Would they drop their pants when Grenell appeared in Pristina with the demands he had received directly from the construction site they had given him in Belgrade? Would they blame themselves if the West remained silent about Radoićić’s terrorist attack and turned a blind eye to Vučić’s “wounded hand” in order to implement the agreements reached?
What about Tirana? Would they forgive Edi Rama when he spoke of “no man’s land”? Would they accept his joint adventure with the Serbian president for a Balkan Open to the detriment of Kosovo? Would they tolerate it when, in the case of the kidnapping of three policemen, he could not say that the Serbs had crossed the border, or when, in the case of Banjska, he could not point the finger at Belgrade? And with his draft for the association, would they agree?
So, what would be the anti-isolation alternative to a government without Vetëvendosje? Would it become sympathetic to the West by making concessions and giving up territories? Would it return to the ridiculous psychosis of naming Ujman as “Lake Trump” and the politics of obedient yesmen, who sacrifice the state to stay in power?
Precisely to see how possible it is to implement in practice what they have been propagating when they had nothing in hand, it is worth trying an opposition government. For this reason, it would be interesting to see what would happen if Albin Kurti could withdraw with full will, especially since with the electoral power he has behind him, with the crisis button he can press, from now on for the election of the speaker of parliament until the election of the next president, he holds the reins of local politics in his hands.
It is hard to say that a loose opposition coalition, where the parties have already started blackmailing each other, as if the great danger Kurti had suddenly averted, could have the guts to accept concessions similar to those for which he accused the current government of inaction. They would be threatened equally, both by the people, as well as by each other’s personal egos.
But although, personally, I think that such a hypothesis could have serious consequences for Kosovo, intellectually it would perhaps be worth it for this experiment to finally put an end to a debate that has plagued the public scene of this four-year-old. If he is determined to surrender sovereignty in the name of preserving alliances that, ultimately, serve above all to avoid making irreparable concessions. From this perspective, a decision by Albin Kurti to withdraw into the opposition could help resolve this dilemma. But no one can bet that he will do so, because, unlike those who clash over ideas, for professional politicians power is not a fruit that is enjoyed intellectually. (lapsi.al)
