The American president has given the biggest boost to European integration since the end of the Cold War.
By Gideon RACHMAN
Donald Trump will never win the Nobel Peace Prize. But he should be a strong contender for the Charlemagne Prize, which is awarded annually to the person who has made the greatest contribution to European unity. The US president has drawn on Russia, undermined trust in the NATO alliance, threatened the EU with tariffs and encouraged the far right in Europe. All of this has had a galvanizing effect on the EU. Fundamental steps towards greater European unity – stalled for decades – are now underway. There are three main areas to look at. The first is European defence; the second is common European debt; the third is repairing the rift between the UK and the EU.
Dramatic swings in European public opinion support these developments. A poll last week showed that 78 percent of Britons consider Trump a threat to the United Kingdom. Some 74 percent of Germans and 69 percent of French agree. In another poll, France was rated as a “reliable partner” by 85 percent of Germans and Britain scored 78 percent – the US has fallen to 16 percent.
Many European leaders agree that Trump’s America is now a threat, though few will say it out loud for diplomatic reasons. They are also aware of how the transatlantic alliance, now in its eighth decade, has made them too dependent on American military support. This is not just a matter of money. The truly dangerous dependencies are on American technology and weaponry. Europeans can see how much trouble the Ukrainians are in after the Trump administration’s decision to cut off intelligence and arms flows. So they are pursuing a two-track policy. They should delay the cutoff of American military support for Europe for as long as possible, while preparing for that moment as soon as possible.
That was the logic behind last week’s decision to allow the European Commission to raise 150 billion euros to spend on the EU’s defense industry. The new spending is likely to focus on areas where European countries are particularly dependent on America, such as air defense.
Issuing joint European debt is not just a way to raise money for defense. It also offers the opportunity to build the euro as an alternative to the dollar as a global reserve currency. The whims of the Trump administration will mean there is considerable global appetite for an alternative to U.S. Treasuries as a safe haven. The taboo against joint European debt is traditionally strong in frugal Germany. It was partially broken during the pandemic. Now it is likely to be erased. Friedrich Merz, who will be Germany’s next chancellor, is also moving to exempt national defense and infrastructure spending from his country’s constitutional limits on deficit spending. Its past fiscal prudence means Germany has much more room to borrow than heavily indebted France or Britain.
A form of military Keynesianism could revive Europe’s largest economy. As a leading French businessman told me, with more than a touch of ambivalence: “It’s very clear. The Germans can’t sell their cars. So they’re going to make tanks.”
Trump’s latest European favoritism is to accelerate the post-Brexit rapprochement between the EU and the UK. Sir Keir Starmer and Emmanuel Macron, the British and French leaders, have worked closely together on Ukraine. They could form a powerful triumvirate with Merz. One mechanism for increasing military spending would be a new European defense fund, in which Britain could participate. This would have the added virtue of giving the UK and the EU a new form of cooperation that avoids reopening the Pandora’s box of Brexit. The prospect of repairing some of the damage caused by Brexit underlines that this is not just a moment of threat for Europe. It is also a moment of opportunity. Europe can now credibly offer a more stable business environment than Trump’s America – which may already be reflected in the relative performance of US and European stock markets.
As the Trump administration steps up its attack on American universities, there is also a chance to lure top researchers to Europe. The gap in salaries and research money between North America and Europe is large. But the overall amounts of money involved are small, when compared to the sums being thrown at defense.
There will be many disagreements and setbacks on the road to greater European unity. France and Germany are already clashing over how the EU’s new defense fund will spend its money. Any such clash will fuel the skepticism of those who say Europe will never come together. There were similar doubts and setbacks on the often bumpy road to the creation of the original European coal and steel community in the 1950s and the single currency in the 1990s. But European leaders got there in the end because the political imperative to agree was so overwhelming. All the great strides forward for European unity have been triggered by geopolitical shocks—first the end of World War II; then the end of the Cold War. Now, courtesy of Trump, we are seeing the end of the transatlantic alliance. Europe responded with strength and invention to two recent great challenges. It can do it again.
