China and Russia are using their alliance to limit Western supremacy, and India is exploiting this competition to strengthen its autonomy. As long as these three players remain bound by interests, the West will no longer be able to dictate the rules of the game alone.
By Ettore SEQUI
The SCO summit in Tianjin and today’s parade in Beijing convey a single message: diplomacy and power, demonstrating that the global order is no longer negotiated solely in the West. The final declaration of the SCO (Shanghai Cooperation Organization) calls for a “post-Western” order based on sovereignty and non-interference, essentially declaring that the world can be reorganized without the United States, and partly against it. The military parade is the counterpoint, a Chinese instrument of strategic communication: China presents itself as the “guardian” of the post-war order, combining historical memory and current legitimacy.
Beijing presents itself to the Global South as an actor of stability and, with the summit-parade duo, transforms the victory over Japan into a political message: sovereignty over Taiwan as a continuation of the 1945 order. Beijing has been a decisive player in the past, is a great power in the present and therefore aspires to shape the future of the world.
The SCO is its instrument. Each gets what it needs. Beijing provides leadership, Moscow provides oxygen and legitimacy, and New Delhi sends the message that it does not accept American impositions and that it has influential friends. So far, Beijing has achieved a success in communication, serving to strengthen its credibility in the global South and to play catch-up with India. More tactics than strategy: vague formulas abound, such as the SCO Development Bank. But the most powerful message is the image of the three leaders, Xi, Putin and Modi, shaking hands, a vivid representation of a suitable agreement.
The Putin-Xi bilateral relationship deserves attention. Beijing has allayed fears, heightened after the Putin-Trump meeting in Anchorage, of a possible Russian “tango step” with Washington.
The price is the deal for the Power of Siberia 2 gas pipeline: until now postponed, Beijing did not want to increase its energy dependence, now a real financial incentive and the legitimacy of a major investment for Moscow.
In this context, the Russian-Chinese relationship is a functional convergence: a marriage of convenience. India is the key point: hit by US tariffs, it keeps Russian energy at low prices and signals that it is no one’s vassal. A key place in containing China is Washington itself, which is pushing it towards Beijing. This is why New Delhi is showing strategic caution: it approaches without aligning, keeping options open. Ukraine is the big absence/present. Paradoxically, the final declaration, also approved by Moscow, speaks of territorial integrity and respect for sovereignty, but does not mention Kiev.
This lack speaks louder than words: part of the world has normalized war. As long as major buyers absorb Russian crude and refined products, sanctions are not decisive. For Europe, the dilemma is threefold.
First: sanctions. Without global consensus, “maximum pressure” on Russia weakens.
Second: the diplomatic tool. While Brussels insists on “condemnation + support for Kiev,” other countries are building platforms that repre- sent Moscow.
Third: strategic autonomy. If Washington chooses tariffs and a transactional approach, the EU must decide whether to align itself or build an independent offering to India and the Global South.
Europe still possesses three essential assets – markets, standards and regulatory credibility – but it must stop just proclaiming them. They must be translated into tangible benefits. With India, this means investment and co-development; with the Mediterranean and Africa, tangible public goods – corridors for grain, fertilizer and energy – rather than mere announcements. Only in this way can we respond to Tianjin with a credible counter-thesis: orderly, not anti-Western multipolarity. Here the American essence comes to the fore. The uncertainty sown by the United States – tariff wars, diplomatic vacillations and a lack of vision – allows China to consolidate discontent.
While Trump offers tariffs and instability, Beijing proposes global governance, multilateralism and stability. The “Global Stability Initiative”, launched in Tianjin, still generic but complemented by other Chinese initiatives on security, development and civilization, demonstrates Xi’s ambition to build a framework of orderly multipolarity.
It is this ambition, in contrast to a short-sighted and tactical American vision, that makes China the catalyst for the frustrations of others. The basic political point is clear. Tianjin and the September 3 parade institutionalize a pragmatic multipolarity that rewards those who offer solutions and punishes those who export uncertainty. Tianjin shows us that the world is not yet multipolar in terms of capacity, but it is already multipolar in terms of options. China and Russia are using their alliance to limit Western supremacy, and India is exploiting this competition to strengthen its autonomy. As long as these three players remain bound by interests, the West will no longer be able to dictate the rules of the game alone.
