Ahmad al-Chareh’s visit constitutes an important step in Damascus’ diplomatic rehabilitation, but its concrete impact will depend less on photos in the White House and more on decisions by the US Congress and Israel’s security calculations. This visit is a significant turning point, but its strategic effect remains, for now, limited.
Nga L’Orient-Le Jour
No Syrian president has ever been welcomed to the Oval Office. Eleven months after his surprise rise to power, Ahmad al-Chareh will be welcomed by Donald Trump on November 10, becoming the first Syrian head of state to enter the White House. The visit, seen as a major step towards Ahmad al-Chareh’s international rehabilitation, is part of a US strategy to reshape the regional balance. But the interactions between the two leaders, which began last May, remain largely symbolic. Beyond the diplomatic images, the main issues – the lifting of sanctions, security with Israel and the fight against the Islamic State (ISIS) – remain unclear, while the political calculations of Donald Trump and Ahmad al-Chareh only partially coincide. Al-Chareh seeks rapid international recognition. Trump is pursuing a pragmatic goal: to stabilize the Syrian front without investing much political capital.
“CAESAR” LAW: THE FIRST TEST
Three topics will dominate the visit: the possibility of lifting US sanctions, the creation of a security mechanism between Syria and Israel, and the inclusion of Damascus in the international coalition against ISIS. In each of these areas, political obstacles remain large. The first test will be that of the “Caesar” law, which since 2020 has determined most of the US sanctions on Syria. The Trump administration has spoken out in favor of repealing it, after a vote in the Senate in October paved the way for the unconditional lifting of sanctions. However, the text still needs to be harmonized with the version approved by the House of Representatives, through a joint legislative conference. No significant progress has been made to date, despite the favorable political climate in Washington.
The security issue with Israel is even more delicate. Initial hopes for a normalization agreement have been abandoned in favor of a more limited mechanism, aimed at reducing the risk of military escalation. Syrian Foreign Minister Assaad al-Shaibani recalled at the recent Manama Dialogue that “this is not about rapprochement, but about protecting Israel.” Neither Washington nor Damascus seem able, at the moment, to establish a security structure that would effectively limit Israeli operations in southern Syria. The fifth round of talks is expected to begin after al-Chareh’s visit, but the United States does not seem in a hurry to reach an agreement. Donald Trump’s spontaneous statements during his trip on Air Force One gave the impression that Syria is not among his diplomatic priorities.
NEGOTIATIONS ON INTEGRATION OF SDFS IN Stalemate
The third issue concerns Syria’s inclusion in the international coalition against ISIS. The announcement is largely symbolic and does not really change the military balance on the ground. The coalition, which includes 89 members (including Lebanon), officially ended its mission in Iraq in September, but continues to operate in Syria, where the American role is now limited to supporting the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF).
Washington wants to ensure a smooth security transition and avoid an immediate split with Mazloum Abdi, the commander of the SDF. Ideally, the US would like a coordination agreement between al-Chareh and the SDF, which would allow the Syrian army to gradually take control of the fight against ISIS, while maintaining operational guarantees for Kurdish forces. But negotiations on integration have stalled. The Pentagon does not consider the Syrian government capable of taking control alone of the areas where ISIS has increased attacks in recent months, moving from desert areas to urban ones. The lack of a transition agreement also complicates the fate of the al-Hol camp, where thousands of fighters and family members associated with the jihadist organization are being held. Without tangible progress, the US presence in Syria is expected to continue, at least in the form of targeted attacks and logistical support, such as the one carried out in September in the villages of Idlib.
In this context, Ahmad al-Chareh’s visit may bring declarations of will, but not immediate results. This gap between diplomatic gesture and lack of concrete achievements reflects the uncertainty surrounding the new American policy towards Syria.
POSSIBLE STRATEGIC CONSEQUENCES
If Washington were to effectively lift sanctions, two major developments would be observed: a return of international investment for reconstruction, which would affect regional economic corridors; and a reshaping of the security architecture, especially by limiting Hezbollah’s military space. Such a domino effect would directly affect Lebanon. The United States, through its envoy Tom Barrack, has signaled that it expects Beirut to make clearer political choices. If Damascus repositions itself as Washington’s political partner, Lebanon may be forced, over time, to define its interests more clearly, especially on the issue of Hezbollah’s weapons and control of the Syrian-Lebanese border.
On the diplomatic front, this visit marks a break from years of complete economic isolation of the Damascus regime. But this step also carries a risk: granting legitimacy too quickly to a government that does not yet control all of the territory and where national reconciliation remains fragile. Support for Ahmad al-Shareh could strengthen his authority without resolving the country’s deep divisions.
On the American side, the priorities remain unchanged: securing Israel, containing Iranian influence, and avoiding a dangerous vacuum that could be exploited by ISIS. For Trump, al-Chareh is useful as long as he contributes to these three objectives, no more, no less. For Ahmad al-Chareh, American recognition is politically vital: It would allow him to ease economic pressure and tighten control over border trade flows. But the relationship remains asymmetrical: The United States is not ready to sacrifice its partnership with the SDF; Israel has shown no sign of softening its military approach in Syria; and the lifting of sanctions depends not on a presidential decree but on a legislative process.
Ahmad al-Chareh’s visit constitutes an important step in Damascus’ diplomatic rehabilitation, but its concrete impact will depend less on photos in the White House and more on the decisions of the US Congress and Israel’s security calculations. This visit is a significant turning point, but its strategic effect remains, for the time being, limited.
