It would be a fool’s game for Putin to test the willingness of NATO countries to defend the alliance’s eastern border. Unfortunately, as the world discovered when Russian forces advanced on Kiev in 2022, Putin is more than capable of making fools of himself.
By Gideon RACHMAN
How committed is NATO to defending the Baltic states? That was the question Vladimir Putin was indirectly asking when Russian fighter jets violated Estonian airspace last week. NATO’s public stance is clear: the 32-nation alliance will defend every inch of its territory. That commitment is on display at the Tapa military base in Estonia, near the Russian border. Tapa – which means “kill” in Estonian – was once a Soviet air base. Today it is the main base for the Estonian army and a British-led NATO battle group. Troops from the Royal Tank Regiment had just arrived when I visited Tapa last week. Together with a smaller French contingent, they have an impressive arsenal of weapons at their disposal – including Challenger 2 tanks, Archer artillery systems and Griffon armoured vehicles.
British, French and Estonian troops have an integrated command structure and would enter battle together – if a Russian invasion of Estonia ever occurred.
The soldiers at Tapa are trained to repel a full-scale Russian attack. But Western planners think it is more likely that Russia will initially act gradually – carrying out small, obscure operations to test NATO’s response and unity.
The violation of Estonian airspace last week fits into this pattern, especially when you consider that it followed a major incursion by Russian drones into Poland last week. Some of the drones were shot down by NATO aircraft, and the allies have deployed more aircraft to the eastern border. NATO will discuss this week how to respond to the violation in Estonia. Some within the alliance argue that, in the future, NATO should shoot down Russian aircraft that violate its airspace. But others, particularly in the United States, believe that this would be a dangerous escalation. Russia could gradually increase provocations to test these hidden divisions within NATO. One much-discussed scenario is an incursion by Russian ground troops into one of the Baltic states – perhaps under the pretext of protecting ethnic Russians.
The Kremlin’s ultimate goal is to show that NATO’s Article 5 mutual security guarantee is invalid. If the Russians could prove this, then they could try to take over smaller European states one by one – without having to face the combined might of NATO.
The main question mark for Moscow is Washington’s response. The US provides about 40% of NATO’s military capabilities in Europe and some of its most advanced capabilities. There are also US troops in the Baltic states. A Himars artillery unit recently conducted exercises in Tapa, and a US tank company is expected to arrive soon. But if the Russians were ever to launch a major incursion into Estonia or another NATO country, the obvious question is: how would Donald Trump react? As former Lithuanian Foreign Minister Gabrielius Landsbergis put it last week: “If there is an incursion and an attack… what can Putin expect? The US Sixth Fleet entering the Baltics or a call to meet in Alaska?”
Beneath the surface, there is real tension between the Trump administration and its Baltic allies. In Washington, I have heard complaints about the “Estonianization” of European foreign policy—a reference to the fact that Kaja Kallas, the EU’s foreign policy chief, is a former Estonian prime minister. To some in the Trump administration, the Baltics are seen as too aggressive in their stance toward Putin. At a high-level meeting at the Pentagon, Baltic officials were accused of being “ideological” in their opposition to Russia.
The suspicion is mutual. In the corridors of the Estonian foreign ministry last week – outside the offices of top officials – I saw a large reproduction of the voting board from the UN debate on Ukraine last February, in which the US voted alongside Russia. The message was clear: don’t assume that Trump’s America is on our side.
The major European countries are much more consistent than the Trump administration in their insistence on the need to counter Russian aggression. But they are also very nervous about the idea of confronting Russia without the US at their side – just look at the debates about the possibility of a “European security force” in Ukraine, without an American “guarantee” behind it. But while NATO faces uncertainty, the Russians face the same. Trump is so unpredictable that his reactions to an international crisis cannot be predicted. Many Trump analysts thought he would never authorize American participation in bombing Iran. And yet he did just that. Even if America were to stand aside in a crisis in the Baltics, the British, French, Germans and Canadians all have troops stationed there, sworn to fight. Poland and Finland – both well-armed nations – know that their security is closely linked to the fate of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. They would also, most likely, defend the Baltic states.
It would be a fool’s errand for Putin to test the will of NATO countries to defend the alliance’s eastern border. Unfortunately, as the world discovered when Russian forces advanced on Kiev in 2022, Putin is more than capable of making fools errands. (Financial Times)
