The US president has the sole authority to order a nuclear attack, even if every advisor in the room is against it.
By Mackenzie KNIGHT-BOYLE
Three minutes, a football, and a cookie. That’s all it takes for a president of the United States to start a nuclear war. During a 1974 meeting with lawmakers, President Richard M. Nixon reportedly declared, “I can go to my office and pick up the phone, and in 25 minutes 70 million people will be dead.” He was right. And since then, despite the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union, little has changed. The nuclear launch process and the law that gives the president such power, enhanced by 21st-century technology, combine to form a perfect storm in which the president can choose to launch nuclear weapons through a ruthless process that leaves little or no room for error.
In the United States, the president is the only person in the country who can legally order the use of nuclear weapons, a power referred to as “sole authority.” The president may choose to consult with advisers, but is not required to do so. He can order the use of nuclear weapons over the objections of any adviser in the chamber.
Of course, the president should want to consult with his top advisers. But with norms collapsing in all aspects of government—even national security—enhanced safeguards are required. Nuclear use should not be at the whim of one person. Sole presidential authority was established at the dawn of the nuclear age during the Truman administration because of Harry S. Truman’s desire to keep nuclear weapons out of the hands of overzealous, gun-ready generals—“a stylish lieutenant colonel,” as he put it. An official policy was established in 1948, stating: “The decision to use atomic weapons in case of war shall be made by the Chief Executive when he deems such a decision necessary.” The policy remained in effect throughout the Cold War—and remains in effect to this day.
Anyone who looks closely at images of American presidents out and about – on their way to a meeting, boarding Air Force One or even going for a run – will notice a constant presence behind the president: a military official carrying a large black bag.
The roughly 12-pound leather bag is known as the “nuclear football” and allows the president to order the launch of nuclear weapons at any time from any location. Inside the nuclear football is everything the president needs to give the order. Unlike many pop-culture references, this one doesn’t include a big red button. It does, however, include the “black book,” which lists a president’s options for the timing, type of delivery system, and targets for a nuclear strike. The black book once included a series of war plans, but after President Jimmy Carter complained that its content was too dense and complicated, it was simplified into a sort of menu of attacks for the president to choose from. The start of nuclear war, the potential deaths of millions of people, and the choice of which cities to destroy — the black book distills these realities into a sanitized list of options that a former military aide to President Bill Clinton likened to a “Denny’s breakfast menu.”
The attack menu is accompanied by secure communications equipment that allows the president to call the Pentagon’s National Military Command Center (NMCC) to transmit the order. To verify a launch order, the president must identify himself with a unique code. The code is written on a small card known as a “cookie,” which the president carries with him at all times.
Once the president’s identity is confirmed and the order is transmitted, the Pentagon can execute the launch order in about a minute. If the president chose an attack option involving intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), the missiles would be fired in about two minutes. There is no way to recall or disarm ICBMs once they have been launched. Experts estimate that—to ensure the United States’ ability to retaliate before a future attack occurs and potentially destroys the command and control system (or the president himself)—a president would have less than 10 minutes to consider the situation and his options before making a decision about whether to launch nuclear weapons.
The rationale behind this process is that it allows a president to respond quickly and decisively in the event of an imminent nuclear attack directed at the United States. During the Cold War, this was seen as the best – and perhaps only – way to deter an immediate nuclear attack by the Soviet Union, by convincing the Soviet leadership that the US president would be able to respond in kind before their own attack could be launched.
When the Soviet Union collapsed and the Cold War ended, the threat of a massive surprise attack disappeared. However, the system that emphasized the speed of launching nuclear weapons remained in place. Some national security officials argue that this process is still necessary. But the president’s authority to order nuclear use is not limited to cases of imminent or confirmed attack on the United States. The president can, legally and logistically, simply order the Pentagon to launch missiles. Even when warning systems indicate that an attack is underway, it could be a false alarm. This has happened on several occasions in the past, as recently as 2018.
On the morning of January 13, 2018 — just days after President Donald Trump and North Korean Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un exchanged nuclear threats — smartphones across Hawaii received an alert from the state’s Emergency Management Agency (EMA): “Ballistic missile threat toward Hawaii. Seek immediate shelter. This is not a drill.”
But the attack did not happen. Someone at EMA had pressed the wrong button. If a false alarm of multiple incoming nuclear missiles had occurred within the national warning system, the president would have been notified and could have initiated a nuclear launch before it was discovered to be a false alarm. One of the most dangerous false alarms publicly known occurred on November 9, 1979. Warning screens at the Pentagon’s NMCC and three other command centers suddenly lit up, showing nearly 1 Soviet ballistic missiles headed toward the United States. Following proper procedures, fighter jets were scrambled, nuclear bomber crews were ordered to their aircraft, nuclear missile crews were put on high alert, and the president’s emergency air command post, known as the “doomsday plane,” was raised.
Six minutes after the alarm sounded, officers at the North American Space Defense Command discovered that a training tape simulating a Soviet attack had been mistakenly inserted into their main computer system and transmitted to other command centers.
Numerous incidents like these throughout the nuclear age have revealed the vulnerability of early warning systems to human and technical errors. Today, cyber threats pose an additional concern and exacerbate the vulnerability of these systems. Such weaknesses, combined with the speed with which a president can react, increase the risk that a U.S. president will mistakenly launch a nuclear war. Avoiding nuclear catastrophe also depends on the rationality and stability of whoever occupies the Oval Office. Two nuclear-age presidents—Nixon and Trump—displayed erratic behavior that prompted senior officials to try to intrude on the nuclear chain of command as a safeguard against presidential power.
However, neither Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger in 1974 nor Chairman of the Army Joint Chiefs of Staff General Mark A. Milley in 2020 had the legal authority to do so. Subordinates at the NMCC or at the missile launch facilities would not have been obligated to follow their orders.
The U.S. Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) – the cornerstone of the American military justice system – makes disobedience to lawful orders from a superior officer during peacetime punishable by dishonorable discharge, loss of pay, or even five years in prison. During wartime, disobedience to lawful orders can be punishable by death. The UCMJ also requires military members to disobey unlawful orders. This places young service members in the position of being forced to make snap legal decisions as non-legal experts, while under great stress and perhaps without knowing why the order was issued. In addition, there is a presumption that orders from a superior officer – and, especially, those given by the commander-in-chief – are lawful.
We cannot forever rely on one person’s willingness to take responsibility to protect ourselves from the whims of an irrational or unstable president. Several proposals have been put forward to prevent a president from being able to use nuclear weapons contrary to the national interest.
A central challenge, however, is that experts disagree about the main problem with the current system. Is it unconstitutional for a president to unilaterally launch nuclear weapons, thus starting a war, which is a power reserved for Congress? Does the president’s sole authority bias him in favor of nuclear use? Does it place an unfair burden on military subordinates who must carry out a disastrous order?
Or is the real problem that intercontinental ballistic missiles can be launched in two minutes, leaving little time for correction? But almost all experts agree that something needs to be done. In 2021, nearly 700 scientists and other experts signed a letter urging President Joe Biden, among other nuclear risk-reduction measures, to reverse the sole authority policy to protect against a “reckless” or “unstable” future president. As the world enters a new era of heightened nuclear risk with expanding global nuclear arsenals, increasing prevalence of nuclear threats and aggressive rhetoric, shrinking decision-making times and cyber capabilities, diminishing diplomacy and transparency, and a U.S. president with a history of making nuclear threats, action is urgently needed to reduce the risk of nuclear war.
