Putin will continue to test the limits of what is permissible. He aims to humiliate NATO and deepen divisions in the West by exposing the friction between the countries on the eastern flank, which are directly threatened by his provocations, and the more fortunate allies – such as the Italians, the French and the British – who, for now at least, can maintain a calmer stance. However, the latter have fighter jets stationed in the area, and it is these aircraft that will have to be used to teach Putin the lesson.
By Sergey Radchenko
Last month, a swarm of Russian drones violated Poland’s borders. Some were shot down. A few days later, another Russian drone flew over Romanian airspace, heading towards Ukraine. Romanian air defenses let it go. Then, on September 19, three Russian MiG-31s entered Estonian airspace. Italian F-35s – on a NATO mission in the area – intercepted the Russians and escorted them out.
Russia has violated NATO airspace before, but the scale of these latest provocations makes them stand out from the rest. The violations will only end when the intruders are shot down. Fortunately, the occasional downing of a Russian fighter jet – let alone a drone – is unlikely to lead to a wider escalation. It may even help to reduce tensions, by reinforcing red lines. The Cold War offers important lessons for dealing with such incidents. Although it is often thought in public memory that the Cold War “delegated” the fighting to what we now call the “global south,” as the two superpowers avoided direct military clashes, in fact this was not quite the case.
Since the 1950s, there have been several incidents where American aircraft have been attacked by Soviet interceptors. The most famous occurred on May 1, 1960, when a U-2 piloted by Gary Powers was shot down over Sverdlovsk (now Yekaterinburg), deep in Soviet territory. It was a propaganda victory for the USSR. Not only was there no military response from the US, but then-President Dwight D. Eisenhower temporarily suspended further U-2 flights over Soviet space, as it was deemed too dangerous.
The Soviets shot down another U-2 over Cuba on October 27, 1962, a day that Cold War historians remember as “Black Saturday.” While it may seem like a foolhardy act today, it was only so because it occurred at the height of the Cuban Missile Crisis, when the world was approaching Armageddon. We are not in that situation.
Even on September 1, 1983, when the Soviets shot down a civilian airliner that had mistakenly flown over their territory in the Far East—an incident that killed 269 passengers and crew, including a U.S. congressman—the United States did not respond militarily. One could argue that there was no response because the Americans were more cautious than the Soviets. In fact, both sides were cautious and understood that it was safer to keep their voices down. NATO should take these lessons seriously. Shooting down Russian planes that violate airspace is not a step toward war. It is a necessary preventive measure to maintain credibility in the face of provocations from the adversary. Both sides engage in psychological operations to test the other’s resolve. If violators do not learn a lesson in time, they will conclude that red lines are fictitious and can be crossed without consequences – which will only lead to even more dangerous situations, as the opponent pushes further and further.
There are protocols for dealing with enemy aircraft interference. Even at the height of the Cold War, the two sides found ways to communicate.
As the US begins a strategic withdrawal from Europe, it is up to Europeans to learn to talk to the Russians, including through soldier-to-soldier contacts. For every hour of fiery public statements (at which the Europeans are truly experts), there must be three hours of quiet diplomacy, behind closed doors. But when diplomacy fails, force must be used. When the violators do not respond, the only reasonable response is to shoot them down. And we should be under no illusion that this is exactly what the Russians would do if our planes were to invade their airspace.
Such downings can briefly lead to a rise in tensions. This happened, for example, on November 24, 2015, when the Turkish military shot down a Russian bomber that had violated its airspace. The Russians’ initial reaction was militant, and they imposed sanctions on Turkey. But later, Vladimir Putin chose to put the episode behind him and embrace politically with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. It also helped that the latter expressed regret. Both sides understood that reducing tensions served their interests. Since then, the Russians have refrained from military provocations against Turkey – a clear indication of the Kremlin’s unwilling ability to learn lessons.
Putin will continue to test the limits of what is permissible. He aims to humiliate NATO and deepen divisions in the West by exposing the friction between the countries on the eastern flank, which are directly threatened by his provocations, and the more fortunate allies – such as the Italians, the French and the British – who, for now at least, can maintain a calmer stance. However, the latter have fighter jets stationed in the area, and it is these aircraft that will have to be used to teach Putin the right lesson.