Beijing is operating under double standards: it supports Moscow politically but constrains it economically. The US strikes at the core of Russian power and gains a channel for dialogue with China, which nevertheless remains its strategic adversary. The war remains uncertain, but the landscape is changing: Asia is no longer Russia’s refuge, China is no longer an unconditional partner, and energy is the new forced diplomacy. In this economy of power, China does not choose between Moscow and Washington: it chooses itself.
By Ettore SEQUI
Beijing’s decision to suspend purchases of Russian oil, following US sanctions on Rosneft and Lukoil, is an economic choice with profound political implications. The move is both a tactical move and a long-term signal, situated at the intersection of the war in Ukraine, US-China strategic competition, and the global energy balance. It is not an isolated act: it reflects Beijing’s dual need to protect its economic security and preserve political space for dialogue with Washington.
The timing is not coincidental. China has just concluded the Fourth Plenum of the Communist Party Central Committee, where Xi presented the 2026-2030 five-year plan and reviewed strategic priorities. At the same time, a possible meeting between Xi and Donald Trump at the APEC summit in late October is approaching. In the tariff negotiations, China cannot afford to let tensions with Washington escalate. The temporary suspension of Russian oil is a gesture of appeasement and a signal of pragmatism, to create a more favorable climate for an agreement that both powers seek: tariff reductions, market stability and better mutual access to microprocessors and critical materials.
The Chinese economy remains fragile. Deflation is eroding margins and confidence, youth unemployment is rising, and local governments are burdened with debt. Beijing’s priorities are to ensure sufficient growth to contain unemployment, especially among the youth, and to avoid the “middle-income trap,” which afflicts economies that stagnate after rapid growth.
After the Plenum’s decisions, Xi must calm a restless society. Stability in energy prices and security of supply are essential to contain discontent and maintain domestic order. Reducing the risk of US sanctions is thus a political precaution before it is an economic one. Beijing will not break with Moscow, but it will not challenge the financial order to be dominated by the dollar. China often talks about de-dollarization, but it knows that no alternative currency can replace the dollar in oil trade today.
US sanctions hit the core of the Russian economy, stopping companies from operating in dollars and imposing direct risks on partners. Secondary sanctions extend the threat to banks, insurers, traders and transporters. Big Chinese companies do not want to be exposed. Better to suspend and preserve negotiating margins before the Xi-Trump summit.
China operates on three levels:
Economic: protects interests in tariff negotiations, aims to reduce barriers and consolidate a new balance in value chains.
Political: prepare the ground for the Xi-Trump meeting, avoiding hostile gestures.
Strategic: warns Moscow: cooperation continues, but support is not unlimited. Beijing will not pay the price of Russian war nor sacrifice technological and financial interests.
US sanctions, designed to hit Russia, are weakening the Beijing-Moscow bond. Trump has understood this: he declared that China “can facilitate a solution” and wants to discuss it with Xi. China, benefiting from reduced American attention in the Indo-Pacific, is now aiming for concrete concessions: less pressure on Taiwan, more flexibility in the export of advanced chips, and selective tariff relief.
For Moscow, the consequences are immediate. With China and India reducing purchases, Russia loses two markets that absorb the bulk of its oil exports. It is not a fatal blow, but a structural weakening. Every barrel lost costs the Kremlin time and liquidity. It is the price of an increasingly expensive and difficult-to-maintain conflict. So far, Moscow has not reacted to the Chinese decision. The Kremlin knows it cannot abandon Beijing, but Chinese caution indicates an increasingly unequal dependence. For Ukraine, these dynamics open up an opportunity. New US sanctions, European harmonisation on LNG and the Russian fleet, and Chinese caution on energy purchases make Putin’s strategy more expensive. The Russian advantage is eroding over time, while China turns caution into diplomatic leverage. The message is clear: power is no longer found in the well, but in the flows. Whoever controls payments, insurance, and international standards controls the speed of money, and thus of war.
In this new balance, Beijing operates with double standards: it supports Moscow politically but limits it economically. The US strikes at the core of Russian power and gains a channel for dialogue with China, which nevertheless remains its strategic adversary. The war remains uncertain, but the landscape is changing: Asia is no longer Russia’s refuge, China is no longer an unconditional partner, and energy is the new forced diplomacy. In this economy of power, China does not choose between Moscow and Washington: it chooses itself.
