Israel and Iran are already engaged in a showdown that will test their patience for pain and their willingness to escalate the conflict. So far, Israel has the upper hand. But as this war unfolds, its resilience – and that of its American ally – will be tested.
During the second and third night of attacks, dozens of Israel Defense Forces (IDF) fighter jets operated over Tehran, a dramatic demonstration of Iranian air superiority and helplessness. This followed a first night in which 220 aircraft attacked surface-to-air missile batteries, nuclear facilities, and leadership targets. Meanwhile, Mossad teams in Iran launched drones at long-range missiles that would be used to strike Israel.
Over more than two decades in Iran, the Israeli intelligence agency has built a powerful network, capable of accessing dozens of well-placed sources within the regime and carrying out missions on the ground. Previous assassinations of nuclear scientists have been carried out through Iranian proxy forces (including individuals from the Baloch minority), but Friday night’s operations also involved Israeli operatives inside the Islamic Republic, using drones and long-range anti-tank weapons to attack Iranian ballistic missiles being prepared for launch.
Iran’s response, described as “retaliation without limits,” included a wave of drones in the first 48 hours (all of which were shot down), followed by a barrage of 200 ballistic missiles. Traveling through space at speeds of thousands of kilometers per hour, these are much harder to stop, and some of them reached as far as central Tel Aviv, falling near the defense ministry. Israel reported three dead and 60 wounded, while Iranian media reported dozens of casualties. In response to the overnight attacks, Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz warned: “If [Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei continues to fire missiles at Israeli territory, Tehran will burn.”
DOMINATION OF ESCALATION
The question is: who has the most leverage to drive up the cost? For now, it is Israel. As the first exchanges have shown, it has the capacity to inflict significant damage on Iran – and could do even more by striking key infrastructure like oil terminals or, in an extreme scenario, exposing its nuclear arsenal.
Iran, by contrast, can offer more of the same: missile strikes, although their accuracy is lower than that of Israeli weapons and many of its main targets are fortified underground. If Iran escalates attacks on Israeli economic infrastructure, such as power plants or oil refineries, it will only invite more severe strikes on itself. If Iran strikes American targets in the Persian Gulf, as its leaders have threatened, the calculation also works against Tehran, since provoking the United States to join in Israeli attacks would bring into play additional capabilities such as B-2 bombers with bunker-busting bombs. So far, the Americans have used aircraft and warships to help deter Iranian attacks, but have not carried out direct strikes.
Meanwhile, the effect of the Israeli attacks may be starting to fade. The targets they have been preparing for for months are closing in, Iranian forces are regrouping after the initial strikes, and the situation is becoming more dynamic. The West learned during the 1991 and 2003 wars in Iraq that mobile missile launchers are extremely difficult to neutralize.
There are still doubts about how effectively Israel can strike Iran’s nuclear program, since much of it is buried underground. Initial strikes on the main uranium enrichment facility at Natanz were deemed successful. But Iran also keeps sensitive material in a subterranean complex at Fordow and in armored storage facilities in Esfahan. Whether Israel has an ingenious way to disable these underground facilities is yet to be seen. Both sides have limited reserves of key weapons (for Israel, bunker-busting bombs and interceptor missiles for defense; for Iran, more effective missiles). When these run out, the war will turn into a race to see who can endure the pain the longest – and here a regime like Iran’s has some advantages.
If Iranian missiles occasionally hit key targets in Israel, it would boost Iranian morale. Also, since Israeli jets already regularly fly into Iranian airspace, capturing an Israeli pilot would be a major propaganda victory for Tehran.
WHY NOW?
Assessments of Iran’s progress toward a nuclear weapon had begun to shift. It had long been thought in intelligence circles that, while Iran had increased its production of highly enriched uranium, it had not taken steps to turn it into a weapon since 2003. But last week, the International Atomic Energy Agency declared that Iran had violated its obligations, saying: “The rapid accumulation of highly enriched uranium … is of serious concern.” The agency added that Iran had opened a new, secret enrichment site and was not responding to traces of uranium discovered at three undeclared facilities linked to its former weapons program. Is this evidence of a restarted atomic bomb program? Many experts and policy observers were still undecided.
Then, in midweek, US Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth, questioned by a Senate committee about Iran’s efforts, said: “There are many indications that they are moving towards something that looks very much like a nuclear weapon.” Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, in a televised address on Friday morning, declared: “In recent months, Iran has taken steps that it has never taken before – steps towards weaponizing this enriched uranium.” When might there be a bomb? Within a year, he suggested, or “even within a few months – less than a year.” Public statements suggested a shift in some countries’ assessment of what was happening in Iranian laboratories. President Macron said on Friday that Iran’s nuclear program had entered a critical phase.
WINDOW OF OPPORTUNITY
Before October 7, 2023, Israel knew that any attack on Iranian nuclear facilities would likely bring a massive response, including thousands of missiles from allies of the “axis of resistance,” including Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Houthis in Yemen, and Hamas in Gaza. That’s not to mention Iran’s own vast arsenal of missiles. But Netanyahu’s government changed its calculus. Palestinian units have been crushed during the brutal Gaza campaign, and Hezbollah has been broken by an offensive that began in September 2024 with Operation “Explosive Pager” targeting its leadership.
The following month, Iran launched hundreds of missiles and drones, causing limited damage in Israel but provoking a response that severely damaged Iranian air defenses. To cap a dismal year for the Axis, the regime of Bashar al-Assad—a key Regional ally—fell in Syria. So by the end of last year, a window of opportunity had opened for Israel. Iran’s network of proxies had been weakened and its defenses had been weakened, but both could be rebuilt. Netanyahu knew that time was running out. Also, every passing month gives Iran time to accumulate more enriched uranium and advance toward building a bomb.
THE TRUMP FACTOR
President Trump’s inauguration brought a new element to the game, as it quickly became clear that he would seek a diplomatic path to returning Iran to a limited nuclear program—even though he had rejected such a deal a decade earlier. Over the past few months, the dangerous game has been played on three fronts: Trump has tried to force Iran into negotiations; at the same time, he has pressured Netanyahu not to strike; and Iran has figured out that it can play Trump for time without giving up its uranium enrichment.
The risks of this high-stakes poker game have been heightened by conflicting messages from Trump’s team. His envoy, Steve Witkoff, at one point suggested that Iran could continue enriching uranium as long as it did not weaponize it, but later backed off on that idea. And when the Israeli strike came on Friday, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio quickly distanced himself from it, only to be followed hours later by the president himself, who tweeted: “I gave Iran opportunity after opportunity to deal … Now Iran must make a deal, before there is nothing left.”
The sense that Trump was using the attacks to force his adversary back to the negotiating table was also reinforced by Israeli officials. Israel’s National Security Adviser, Tzachi Hanegbi, acknowledged on Friday: “Iran’s nuclear program cannot be completely destroyed through a military campaign.” It is clear that a deal will be needed. However, Reza H. Akbari, an Iranian-American academic, summed up the media reaction in the Islamic Republic as: “The negotiations were used by the US and Israel as a cover to attack us and were nothing more than a months-long division of labor between Trump and the Zionist regime.” Meanwhile, Iran’s diplomatic mission to the UN tweeted: “The Israeli regime and its backer – namely the United States – will be held fully accountable.”
In other words, whether Trump encouraged this action or was dragged into it by Netanyahu, the Iranians see America as complicit. The promised retaliatory attacks on American bases are now one of the main ways the conflict could escalate.
In April, the US increased its strike force in the Middle East, before scaling it back down. Now, the Pentagon is ordering its return to the Region. And while Britain will hope to keep its aircraft carrier strike group, the HMS Prince of Wales, out of the conflict, it is in the Indian Ocean and could move towards the Gulf if allies or British interests are targeted. Witkoff had planned to meet an Iranian delegation in Oman this weekend for further talks, but the meeting was canceled. Real diplomacy will have to wait, as attacks and counterattacks now dominate the agenda. Iran finds itself increasingly isolated. Hezbollah, once its strongest and most formidable Regional ally, has signaled it will not join in the rocket attacks on Israel. It is under pressure from the Lebanese government, and its fighters are mindful that Iranian aid in their time of need last year was limited.
Meanwhile, the Russian foreign ministry issued a statement with a standard condemnation of the Israeli attacks, concluding with a clear pushback against Iran: “We remind you of the readiness of the United States to hold another round of negotiations on the Iranian nuclear program in Oman.” China, meanwhile, is expected to remain silent, calling for dialogue.
Diplomatic logic, then, favors a return to the negotiating table. Israel itself also understands that it cannot achieve a solution by military means alone. But wounded national pride adds an explosive element of unpredictability. The Iranian leadership, insulted by the humiliations and defeats of recent days, is in no mood to accept the kind of deal that Trump and the Israelis want. In their attempt to deliver a symbolic blow to save face against the enemy, lurks the risk of a catastrophic miscalculation.
