When the clash between the House of Representatives in Tobruk and the General National Congress in Tripoli turned into open conflict, it became clear that Moscow had chosen to support the eastern institutions, but at the same time intended to keep channels open with Tripoli as well.
During the Western intervention against Gaddafi in 2011, Russia reacted with restraint, initially joining the arms embargo, then abstaining in the Security Council vote, which paved the way for the creation of a “no-fly zone” and, indirectly, NATO intervention. Subsequently, Russian policy towards Libya distanced itself from the West, starting with Putin’s condemnation of the extrajudicial killing of the colonel. After the war ended, Russia chose the path of caution, managing – as Major Thomas Arnold of the Center for Strategic and International Studies writes – to secure most of its tactical and strategic objectives without major interference from the West.
When the clash between the House of Representatives in Tobruk and the General National Congress in Tripoli turned into open conflict, it became clear that Moscow had chosen to support the eastern institutions, but at the same time intended to keep channels open with Tripoli as well.
According to the analyst, Russia’s behavior in Libya was part of a broader strategy aimed at providing an alternative to the post-Soviet international order led by the US, through the construction of a multipolar system. Access to the “warm” ports of the Mediterranean was an essential element for maintaining its stature as a superpower. As soon as he came to power, President Vladimir Putin strengthened relations with Gaddafi, writing off Tripoli’s debts – more than five billion dollars – in exchange for contracts for oil, weapons and the construction of railways. He also managed to secure access to the port of Benghazi, questioning the dominance of the US Fifth Fleet in an area that after the Cold War had been considered “a NATO lake”.
But with the fall of Gaddafi, Moscow lost access to Libya and the contracts. The Kremlin responded by expanding the naval capabilities of the Russian Armed Forces, and in 2013, Putin announced the creation of a permanent naval force in the Mediterranean, based in the Syrian port of Tartus.
In October 2018, British intelligence reported the opening of two Wagner Group bases in Benghazi and Tobruk. The private military company Wagner first appeared in 2014, in the Donbas: its fighters had advanced training and were equipped with modern weapons.
According to The Sun, General Haftar had given his approval for the deployment of Russian troops in Libya in order to minimize the influence of the European Union, and in particular Italy. In November of that year, Haftar traveled to Moscow. Waiting for him were Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu and Evgeny Prigozhin, the head of Wagner. It became clear that 1,200 Wagner mercenaries were in Libya to support the offensive on Tripoli. According to American sources, the costs were covered by the United Arab Emirates. Moscow’s support for Haftar’s campaign was complete, to the point that the Russian representative to the UN Security Council vetoed a resolution condemning the offensive on the capital.
The biggest victory for Haftar came in February 2019, with the conquest of the Sharara oil field, the largest in Libya, with a capacity of 300,000 barrels per day.
At that point, he also controlled the so-called “oil crescent” on the coast. A Wagner mercenary described the company’s mission in an interview with the BBC: “There are three monuments to Wagner. One depicts a soldier protecting a child with a gun in his hand. But if the designer were honest, that soldier would be protecting an oil refinery.” After Turkey intervened in the conflict, Haftar’s offensive failed and ended with a ceasefire signed on October 23, 2020. According to the British think tank RUSI, this “cold peace” between Russia and Turkey could turn into cooperation, with unintended consequences for the West: “If the US remains distant from the Libyan conflict and European powers continue to have conflicting agendas, Russia and Turkey may see an opportunity to marginalize Western powers through a peace agreement.”
But events took a different turn with the start of the Russian intervention in Ukraine. On February 27, 2022, three days after the start of the “special military operation” in Ukraine, Turkey banned the passage of Russian warships through the Bosphorus and Dardanelles. By October 2023, the Russian naval presence in the Mediterranean had been reduced to a fifth of its previous size. Some Wagner troops remained in Libya, while many mercenaries moved to Ukraine. This was confirmed by photos published on Facebook in April 2022 by Ukrainian soldiers, showing killed Wagner fighters in eastern Ukraine, who were carrying Libyan and Central African Republic banknotes and Khalifa Haftar’s phone number… (L’espresso)
