It would be understandable to conclude that the “strategic shift to Asia” initiated by President Barack Obama has been replaced by a “strategic shift to the Western Hemisphere.”
By Richard N. Haass
US President Donald Trump spent much of the last week of October in Asia, securing truces on several fronts in a trade war that was largely of his own making, having imposed tariffs on both friends and foes.
What he failed to do, however, was create stable structures in the economic sphere or alleviate growing doubts about the United States’ strategic engagement in the Region.
In fact, there were some worthwhile achievements. Trump’s meetings in Japan, perhaps the most important US ally today because of its economic and military power, as well as its critical role in balancing a stronger and more assertive China, went as well as could be expected, if not better.
A distinctive feature of the Trump administration’s foreign policy is toughness toward friends and allies, but Trump and Japan’s first female prime minister, Sanae Takaichi, got off to a flying start.
This was helped by Takaichi’s close ties to former Prime Minister Abe Shinzō, the foreign leader who forged the closest relationship with Trump during his first term as president. It also helped that Japan is spending more on defense and offering to significantly increase its investment in the United States.
The United States and South Korea have also managed to put their economic relationship on a more stable footing. It is clear that America’s allies in Asia, as well as in Europe, have become more adept at managing the often difficult diplomatic dance with Trump. The compliments, gifts, and ceremonies, coupled with increased U.S. defense spending and investment, can contribute to the success of a visit.
The positive tone of these meetings set a favorable backdrop for the bilateral session between Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping. The meeting produced a kind of truce in the US-China trade war, but it did not resolve deep economic disputes nor address the growing geopolitical tensions between the world’s two largest economies.
China will resume some modest purchases of American soybeans, has promised to limit exports of chemicals used to produce fentanyl and will extend for a year restrictions on exports of rare earth minerals.
For its part, the US will cut overall tariffs on Chinese goods from 57 percent to 47 percent. A deal on the TikTok app appears to be close to being finalized. Meanwhile, new export restrictions that determine what advanced American technology can go to China appear to have been suspended.
But a truce is not a permanent peace. Trade issues can and likely will flare up again, as they did recently between the U.S. and Canada, when Trump was angered by an Ontario government television ad that quoted Ronald Reagan’s criticism of tariffs. Moreover, because many U.S. companies’ supply chains depend on Chinese minerals and components, China retains significant leverage over the U.S. that could be used in any potential crisis.
Perhaps most importantly, what did not come out of the Trump-Xi meeting: the lack of a comprehensive framework for this era of U.S.-China relations, one that would govern not only trade and investment but also geopolitical differences. It is not surprising, then, that these talks ended without a common understanding on Taiwan, while Chinese purchases of Russian energy and support for Russia’s military will continue. While these issues will certainly be discussed and, indeed, dominate Trump’s announced visit to China in April, progress remains highly uncertain.
There was a clear sense of relief in the Region that the US-China economic relationship had turned out somewhat more stable, as no one wants to be forced to choose between these two great powers. For many countries, China is their largest trading partner and a military force to be reckoned with. At the same time, many Indo-Pacific countries depend on the US for their security and economic well-being.
But not everything has gone well in the Region during Trump’s tenure. US relations with Vietnam, like those with India, have deteriorated. China will be the main beneficiary of this distancing between the US and countries that could complicate its defense plans.
More broadly, the US has damaged its standing in many countries in the Region by refusing to join the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership – the Region’s most important trade agreement – as well as by Trump’s extensive use of tariffs.
Many countries are also feeling uneasy about developments within the U.S. itself. The federal government shutdown reflects a country so divided that it cannot function effectively — a perception that has already become widespread due to the government’s inability to manage the country’s growing debt.
Likewise, severe restrictions on immigration, cuts in federal funding for scientific research, and attacks on universities raise questions about the long-term competitiveness and credibility of the United States.
Even more worrying are trends in American foreign policy. Inconsistencies in support for Ukraine and leniency toward Russia have raised fears that the US may follow a similar approach in dealing with the Taiwan issue (and the South China Sea) and relations with China.
Even America’s friends and allies in Asia are failing to grasp the meaning of the US military actions off the coast of Venezuela, in an effort that appears to be aimed at overthrowing the Nicolás Maduro regime, the Trump administration’s deployment of the National Guard in American cities, and the pressure on the Panamanian government to relinquish control of the Panama Canal. The announced intentions to reduce the number of US troops in Europe will add to the impression of a US foreign policy in transition.
One could be forgiven for concluding that the pivot to Asia initiated by President Barack Obama has been replaced by a pivot to the Western Hemisphere. This is certainly not the pivot that America’s friends and allies in Asia have been counting on.
It would be understandable to conclude that the “strategic shift to Asia” initiated by President Barack Obama has been replaced by a “strategic shift to the Western Hemisphere.” This is certainly not the orientation that America’s friends and allies in Asia had hoped for and continue to hope for.
